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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
John Andrew Craven, Sr., appeals from his conviction for failure to register as a
sex offender. Craven claims, for the first time on appeal, that the jury instructions
violated his due process rights.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Craven was previously convicted of rape and was a registered sex offender, which
required him to register his address annually and keep the information up to date. (Tr.,
p.146, L.12 – p.148, L.12; p.248, Ls.7-24.) In August of 2015, Craven was living in the
Boise Inn Motel at 4060 W. Fairview Avenue, room number #208, and duly reported this
address with Idaho’s Sex Offender Registry. (Tr., p.257, L.16 – p.258, L.1.) Craven
moved on August 16, 2015. (Tr., p.99, L.4 – p.100, L.14; p.258, L.8 – p.259, L.19;
p.288, L.18 – p.290, L.10. 1) However, he failed to update or otherwise notify the state of
Idaho or Ada County about the change of address. (Tr., p.163, L.2 – p.169, L.15.)
Craven was arrested pursuant to a parole violation warrant on October 14, 2015 (PSI,
p.3), and the state charged him with failure to register (R., pp.44-45), along with a
persistent violator enhancement (R., pp.63-65).
The case went to jury trial. Craven’s theory of the case was that because he
allegedly only moved from a room inside the motel to the motel parking lot, that his
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Craven claimed he was living out of his car, which he generally, but not always, parked
in the Boise Inn Motel parking lot. (Tr., p.288, L.18 – p.290, L.10.) However, the hotel
manager testified she did not see Craven on her regular inspections of the hotel parking
lot. (Tr., p.104, L.6 – p.107, L.17.)
1

residence had not changed, and that therefore, he was not required to notify the state of
Idaho about a change of address. (Tr., p.306, Ls.4-8; p.402, Ls. 1-11; p.410, Ls.18-25;
p.411, Ls.8-15.)
Prior to closing arguments, the parties reviewed the district court’s “proposed
[jury] instructions.” (Tr., p.358, L.15 – p.365, L.6.) Instruction 13 defined the elements
of the crime of failure to register as follows:
1. On or after the 19th day of August, 2015;
2. in the State of Idaho;
3. the defendant, JOHN ANDREW CRAVEN SR., failed to register a
change in his street address or actual address;
4. in person at the office of the sheriff of the county in which the defendant
resided or was temporarily domiciled;
5. within two (2) working days after the change; and
6. the defendant was at that time required to register under the Sex
Offender Registration Act.
(R., p.167.)
When asked if the parties had any objections to the jury instructions, Craven’s
attorney stated “Judge we have no objection. The defense has no objection to the
instructions as proposed.”

(Tr., p.359, Ls.11-13.)

Craven’s attorney went on to

specifically request an instruction defining residence/abode (Tr., p.359, L.19 – p.364,
L.6), but made no other objections relating to the court’s proposed jury instructions (see
Tr., p.364, L.4 – p.365, L.5).
During deliberation the jury posed a question to the court: “What is the legal
definition in Idaho of ‘residence’, and ‘mailing address’, and is room number or
apartment number a requirement of/required component of either residence or mailing
address?”

(R., p.177.)

The district court proposed the following response to the

question:
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“For purposes of this case ‘residence’ means the offender’s present place
of abode. The term ‘mailing address’ is not defined by the statute. Terms
which are of common usage and are sufficiently generally understood need
not be further defined by the court. The elements you must find in this case
are set forth in the jury instructions previously provided by the court.”
(Tr., p.425, Ls.14-22.) Craven’s counsel affirmatively requested this proposed instruction
be given, stating that “[w]e would request that be given as stated,” which it was. (Tr.,
p.425, Ls.23-24; R. p.178.) The jury returned a verdict of guilty for failure to register,
and Craven pleaded guilty to the persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.179; Tr., p.439,
Ls.2-19.)
Craven was sentenced to a prison term of 18 years, with 3 years fixed. (R.,
p.185.) He timely appeals. (R., pp.188-91.)
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ISSUE
Craven states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court commit fundamental error when it failed to instruct
the jury regarding the knowledge element of the offense?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Was any error in jury instruction invited by Craven and procedurally barred from
raising on appeal; or in any event, has Craven failed to show any error was fundamental?
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ARGUMENT
Craven Invited Any Instructional Error And Is Procedurally Barred From Raising This
Claim For The First Time On Appeal; Alternatively, He Fails To Show Any Fundamental
Error
A.

Introduction
Craven claims, for the first time on appeal, that the jury instructions omitted an

element of the failure to register offense. Craven argues that the jury instructions, like the
information, failed to allege that Craven “knowingly failed to register” as a sex offender.
(Appellant’s brief, p.8 (emphasis in original, citing I.C. § 18-8311(1) (“An offender
subject to registration who knowingly fails to register, verify his address, or provide any
information or notice as required by this chapter shall be guilty of a felony.”).) Craven
claims that because the knowledge element was missing in the jury instructions the
purported instructional error “lowered the State’s burden of proof, and violated Mr.
Craven’s rights under the Due Process [Clause] of the United States and Idaho
Constitutions.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
This argument fails because Craven invited any error and is procedurally barred
from raising this claim from the first time on appeal. Alternatively, Craven fails to show
fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of free review. State

v. Mann, 162 Idaho 36, 40, 394 P.3d 79, 83 (2017) (quoting State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 472, 272 P.3d 417, 444 (2012)). “This Court reviews jury instructions to ascertain
whether, when considered as a whole, they fairly and adequately present the issues and
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state the applicable law.” Id. “Reversible error occurs if an instruction misleads the jury
or prejudices a party.” Id. (quoting Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,
51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000)).

C.

Craven Invited Any Error By Not Objecting To The Elements Instruction, And By
Specifically Requesting Another Instruction Reaffirming The Elements
Instruction
“The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when

his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error.” State v. Norton, 151 Idaho
176, 187, 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819,
864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)). The invited error doctrine seeks to prevent a party
who “caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court” to make a particular
decision from “later challenging that decision on appeal.” State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237,
240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999). “One may not complain of errors one has consented to or
acquiesced in.” Norton, 151 Idaho at 187, 254 P.3d at 88 (citing State v. Caudill, 109
Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d
1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998)).
Not all failures to object to purported instructional errors will constitute invited
error. In Blake, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified that where a court had “an informal
conference” with the parties, and had already “decided on the instructions” it would give,
defense counsel’s “concurrence” with the instructions would not amount to invited error.
133 Idaho at 240, 985 P.2d at 120. There, “counsel’s concurrence did not invite the court
to give the challenged instructions; the judge had already made that decision.” Id. In
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other words, it appeared that the trial court “was merely giving the parties an opportunity
to object on the record.” Id.
This case is distinguishable from Blake and shows a plainly invited error. During
the discussion of jury instructions the parties were not ruminating on finalized
instructions that the court had already decided on; they were discussing “proposed
instructions” and the court was soliciting their input, not merely letting them memorialize
objections for the record. (See Tr., p.358, L.15 – p.359, L.10.) Notably, Craven did
provide input and ask for an additional instruction regarding the definition of “residence,”
but had nothing to say about the knowledge element he now takes issue with. (Tr., p.359,
L.13 – p.364, L.21.) Moreover, Craven specifically told the district court he had “no
objection to the instructions as proposed.” (Tr., p.359, Ls.11-13.)
Later on, Craven went beyond this by specifically requesting the court give an
additional instruction, in response to the jury questions, stating “[t]he elements you must
find are set forth in the jury instructions previously provided by this court”—in other
words, he requested the court affirm the elements instruction was correct. (Tr., p.425,
Ls.14-24.) That distinguishes this case from Blake, where the judge had already decided
on the instructions to give, and was “merely giving the parties an opportunity to object on
the record.” 133 Idaho at 240, 985 P.2d at 120. Here, Craven not only failed to object to
a proposed instruction, but he played an important role in prompting the court to give
another instruction reaffirming “the jury instructions previously provided.” (See Tr.,
p.425, Ls.14-24.)
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Because Craven specifically waived his possible objections to the instructions,
and specifically requested those instructions be affirmed by the court, he invited any
error, and cannot belatedly raise this claim on appeal.
D.

Craven’s Claim Is Procedurally Barred
The applicable rules provide that “[n]o party may assign as error the giving of or

failure to give an instruction unless the party objects to the action before the jury retires to
consider its verdict.” I.C.R. 30(b)(4). This rule requires that defense counsel object to
the instruction “during the jury instruction conference” and to “state distinctly the
grounds of the objection.” State v. Hall, 161 Idaho 413, 422, 387 P.3d 81, 90 (2016).
Here, because Craven’s attorney specifically stated he had no objection to the instructions
(Tr., p.359, Ls.11-13), and moreover, requested the district court give another instruction
affirming the elements instruction (Tr., p.425, Ls.14-24), he is procedurally barred from
assigning error to those instructions on appeal.
Admittedly, the Hall Court did, after applying I.C.R. 30(b)(4), review the lack of
an instruction for fundamental error. 161 Idaho at 422, 387 P.3d at 90. But the state
submits that exception would not apply here, where the issue is not a simple failure to
request an instruction; here, Craven not only stated he had no objection to the elements
instruction, but requested another instruction affirming the elements instruction. (See Tr.,
p.359, Ls.11-13; p.425, Ls.14-24.) In light of Craven’s failure to object, and own request
to reinforce what he now claims was instructional error on appeal, reviewing this claimed
error for the first time on appeal would render I.C.R. 30(b)(4) a nullity.
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E.

Craven Fails To Show Any Fundamental Error
Because Craven did not preserve his claim with an objection below he is required

to show fundamental error on appeal. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961,
978 (2010). To establish fundamental error,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
Craven fails to meet Perry’s first prong, because he fails to show the error
amounts to an unwaived constitutional violation. While the instructions erroneously
omitted the “knowing” element (compare R., p.167 with I.C. § 18-8311(1)), and while
instructional errors relieving the state of its burden to prove an element present a
constitutional issue (see State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 669, 289 P.3d 1059, 1062 (Ct.
App. 2012)), Craven stated that he had no objection to the proposed instructions (Tr.,
p.359, Ls.11-13). By stating he had no objection to the instructions challenged on appeal,
Craven specifically waived any claim of alleged errors in the instructions.
The second prong is also not met here because the purported error is not clear. To
meet this prong, Craven must show that the error is “clear or obvious, without the need
for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision.” Perry, 150 Idaho
at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (emphasis added). Here, there are at least two plain tactical
reasons not to object to the elements instruction as written.

9

The primary tactical reason not to object was because Craven’s hypothetical
knowledge-element argument could not have been presented below. On appeal, Craven
argues that had a knowledge instruction been given, he could have been found innocent
because he “thought he was complying with the registration requirements by residing in
the parking lot of the motel after he checked out.” (See Appellant’s brief, p.5.) Craven
essentially argues that he did not knowingly fail to register because he thought he was in
compliance with the law; or in other words, he appears to argue he made a mistake of
law. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.)
But Craven could not have presented this defense.

It is well settled that

“[i]gnorance of the law is not a valid defense.” State v. Dolsby, 143 Idaho 352, 355, 145
P.3d 917, 920 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181,
183 (1993)). Moreover, the structure of the sex offender registration statute would not
have allowed this defense. The “knowing” element in the statute specifically modifies
the act that the registrant performs—the “failure to register.” I.C. § 18-8311(1). The
“knowing” element does not modify the “as required” element, or otherwise suggest that
the state must prove the defendant has subjective awareness of the requirement to
register. Cf. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 479, 163 P.3d 1183, 1191 (2007) (where
the Court essentially allowed a mistake of law defense, but because the “knowing”
element modified the violation of a separate criminal statute—there, “[b]y its plain
language, the statute impose[d] a civil penalty only where the participant was aware that
the meeting violated the open meeting law”).
As a result, the sex offender registration statute does not imply the registrant can
argue against the general rule, and present a defense that he did not knowingly fail to
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register because he did not know he was required to. See I.C. § 18-8311(1). Because the
evidence plainly showed Craven knew he moved out of his room and failed to register
(see, e.g., Tr., p.238, Ls.3-23; p.305, L.16 – p.306, L.8), and because Craven could not
have argued as a defense that he did not realize he was required to register, this was a
tactical reason not to object to jury instructions omitting the knowledge element.
Along the same lines, a secondary tactical reason not to object was because
Craven’s state of mind was irrelevant to his own theory of the case below. Despite
offhand references to Craven’s knowledge (see Tr., p.414, Ls.4-6), Craven’s theory of the
case below was that he “didn’t notify the Idaho state sex offender registry because he
didn’t have to because he didn’t move.” (Tr., p.411, Ls.12-14 (emphasis added).) In
other words, Craven’s argument wasn’t that he was merely unaware of a registration
requirement; his theory was that as a matter of law there was no requirement. (Tr., p.306,
Ls.4-8; p.402, Ls. 1-11; p.410, Ls.18-25; p.411, Ls.8-15.)
This distinction makes all the difference. Evidence about Craven’s state of mind
necessarily had no relevance to Craven’s guilt or innocence if, as he consistently
maintained below, he never actually changed residences. Highlighting evidence that
Craven lacked knowledge of a registration requirement would have necessarily undercut
his theory of the case—insofar as it would have implied there was such a requirement.
And from a tactical standpoint, presenting this alternative theory would have required
counsel to simultaneously maintain that 1) Craven was innocent because he was not
required to register, and 2) Craven was innocent because he did not know he was required
to register. These theories are contradictory and self-defeating, which is presumably why
Craven argued only one of them. Craven’s own choice of strategy, which necessarily left
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a lack-of-knowledge defense by the wayside, was therefore an additional reason not to
object to jury instructions without a knowledge element.
Lastly, there is no reasonable possibility that the purported error affected the
outcome of the trial. Citing the questions posed by the jury during deliberation, Craven
argues here that “[t]here is a reasonable possibility that the jury could have found Mr.
Craven ‘Not guilty’ if it had known it is only a crime for an offender subject to
registration to knowingly fail to provide information or notice as required.’” (Appellant’s
brief, p.8 (emphasis in original).)
This argument fails because there is no reason to think the inclusion of a
knowledge element would have helped Craven below—it would have been irrelevant at
best, and self-defeating at worst, for Craven to shoehorn a state-of-mind argument into his
theory of the case. And the jurors’ questions only reveal that Craven’s theory of the
case—that he did not actually change residences—must have had some purchase with
them, insofar as their questions zeroed in on the definition of “residence,” and other
arcana relating to the apartment numbers and addresses. (See R., p.177.)
And as noted above, the knowledge element in the statute does not apply to
Craven’s awareness of whether he was required to register; it applies to the act of failing
to register. See I.C. 18-8311(1). As a result, including the knowledge element in the
instructions would have simply appended a “knowing” requirement to instruction 13.3,
dealing with whether Craven failed to update his registration information. (See R.,
p.167.) Adding the “knowing” element would not have, however, modified instruction
13.6—which separately addressed Craven’s requirement to register. (See R., p.167.)
Because the “knowing” element only went to the actual act of failing to register, and it is
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undisputed that Craven knew he had moved out of his room and failed to update his
registration information, this element would have easily been met, had it been included in
the instructions. (See, e.g., Tr., p.238, Ls.3-23; p.305, L.16 – p.306, L.8.) Given the facts
in the record, the theories actually advanced below, and the questions posed by the jury,
there is no indication that the jury’s verdict would have been any different had the jury
been instructed on the knowledge element.
Craven’s claim is barred by the invited error doctrine. It is also barred by I.C.R.
30(b)(4). Even if his claim were reviewable for fundamental error on appeal, Craven has
failed to show any element of a viable fundamental error claim. The defense’s specific
waiver of an objection at trial shows the claim does not involve an unwaived
constitutional right. Moreover, there were clear tactical reasons not to object here.
Finally, even if there was a clear violation of a constitutional right, any error was
harmless.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Craven’s judgment of conviction.
DATED this 5th day of June, 2018.

/s/ Kale D. Gans___________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of June, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Kale D. Gans___________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
KDG/dd
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